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III.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This appeal is brought by the owners of two wind farms, Grouse Creek Wind Park, LLC
and Grouse Creek Wind Park II, LLC ("Grouse Creek"), of the decision of the Idaho Public
Utilities Commission ("Idaho PUC" or "Commission") denying the validity of two Firm Energy
Sales Agreements ("Agreements") between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power Company ("Idaho
Power"). At its core, this case is about the rate (called the "avoided cost" rate) that Idaho Power
pays for independent power, the Commission's process of changing eligibility to that rate, and
the impact that an eligibility change has on developers that have already invested substantial
time, money and effort into a project.
In November 2010, the Commission announced that beginning December 14, 2010, only
wind projects of 100 kilowatts or less would be eligible for contracts at the published rate. Prior
to this announcement, wind farms up to approximately 21,000 kilowatts in size were entitled to
the "published" rate. Non-published rates for wind power, then and now, are significantly less
than published rates. This case is about whether Grouse Creek is legally entitled to the published
avoided cost rate in effect before December 14, 2010, the date the Commission changed the rate
eligibility.

B.

PURPA BACKGROUND.
The Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 ("PURP A") mandates that electric

utilities purchase power from a PURPA qualifying facility ("QF") at the utility's "incremental
cost of alternative electric energy," which is "the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy
which, but for the purchase from such [QF], such utility would generate or purchase from

5

another source." 1 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") regulations implementing
PURP A adopt this statutory "but-for/incremental cost" language as the definition of a utility's
"avoided cost. "2 Simply put, utilities are required to purchase QF power at their respective
avoided cost and QF developers are given the right to lock-in a "legally enforceable obligation"
with a purchasing utility, including the date the obligation is created and the rates associated with
that date. 3 This Court, in A. W Brown v. Idaho Power Co., has recognized a QF' s PURPA right
to "lock-in" the avoided cost rate as of a certain date. 4 FERC has noted in commentary to its
regulations that the purpose of this "legally enforceable obligation" phrase allowing QFs a lockin right is "to prevent a utility from circumventing the requirement that provides capacity credit
for an eligible qualifying facility merely by refusing to enter into a contract with the qualifying
facility." 5 FERC adopted the term "legally enforceable obligation" rather than "contract"
specifically to prevent a utility from circumventing its obligation to purchase simply by refusing
to sign a contract, or, as here, unreasonably delaying the signing of a contract in order to take
advantage of a lower avoided cost rate. 6
PURP A is somewhat unique in its establishment of a partnership between FERC and
state utility commissions regarding the rulemaking and implementation of PURPA. First,

16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d).
18 C.F.R. § 292.101(6) ; see also American Paper Institute, Inc. v. FERC, 461U.S.402, 417-18,
103 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (1983).
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d) allows a QF to require a utility to purchase power "pursuant to a legally
enforceable obligation" with rates established "at the option of the qualifying facility" based on "the
avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is incurred." FERC Order No. 69, FERC Stats & Regs,
if 30,128, RM 79-55, Fed. Reg. Vol. 454, No. 38, ifif 12215, 12224 (1980).
4

A. W Brown Co., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 121Idaho812, 816, 828 P.2d 841, 845 (1992).

5

Small Power Production and Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations Implementing Section 210 of
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Order No. 69, FERC Statutes and Regulations,
Regulations Preambles 2001-2005 if 30,128, at 30,880 (1980) (subsequent history omitted).
6

Cedar Creek Wind LLC, 137 FERC if 61,006 at if 36 (2011).

6

PURP A directed FERC to prescribe rules that are to be implemented, in order for QFs to sell
power to utilities. 7 Then, PURPA authorizes state regulatory commissions 'to implement' the
FERC established rules. 8 Under this partnership, the states and FERC share enforcement powers
under PURPA. A "state commission may comply with the statutory requirements by issuing
regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, or by taking other actions reasonably
designed to give effect to FERC's rules." 9 However, a state may take action under PURPA only

°

to the extent that that action is in accordance with the FERC's rules. 1 Courts have consistently
invalidated state commission actions that are inconsistent with FERC's implementing
11
·
regu1at10ns.

An aggrieved party, such as Grouse Creek, may seek judicial review of a state regulatory
commission decision that improperly implements PURPA 12 , but may also seek enforcement of
PURPA before FERC. 13 If FERC determines that a state regulatory commission improperly
implemented its regulations under PURP A, FERC can bring an "enforcement action" against the
agency in federal district court, or can decline and allow the QF to enforce PURPA rights against
a state commission.

16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(t).

Id.
9

FERCv. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1982).

10

Id., Cedar Creek, 13 7 FERC ii 61,006 at ii 27.

II

See Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 751 (invalidating state commission's refusal to enforce QF's rights to
sell to utility); Freehold Cogeneration Associates, L.P. v. Bd. of Regulatory Commn 'rs of State of NJ., 44
F.3d 1178, 1190-93 (3rd Cir. 1995) (invalidating state commission's attempt to revise QF rates in
executed contract as inconsistent with Section 21 O(e) of PURPA); Ind. Energy Producers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 36 F.3d 848, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating state's attempt to impose
additional efficiency standards not found in FERC's regulations for cogeneration QFs).
12

16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(g).

13

16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h).
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C.

BACKGROUND FACTS.

The two Grouse Creek wind projects are located on privately owned land near Lynn,
Utah, close to the Idaho border, with each project separated in distance by more than one mile. 14
Grouse Creek obtained permits for wind monitoring in 2007 and by 2009, with two years of
documented wind data, determined to proceed to the development phase. 15 The two Grouse
Creek wind projects are qualifying facilities ("QFs"), having filed QF self-certification notices
wit FERC, as required by PURPA. 16
Because the Grouse Creek wind projects are located outside Idaho Power's service
territory, Grouse Creek needed to electrically interconnect to the grid with a nearby utility and
arrange with that third party utility to transmit the Grouse Creek electricity to a point of delivery
on Idaho Power's system. 17 Then, upon receipt of Grouse Creek's energy, Idaho Power would
need to be able to transmit that energy from its point of delivery to Idaho Power, across Idaho
Power's system to its point of use, or load. 18 Consequently, Grouse Creek began in May of 2008
the process of requesting electrical interconnection with nearby Raft River Rural Electric
Cooperative ("Raft River") and the Bonneville Power Administration ("BP A" or "Bonneville"),
over an electrical line Raft River owns, but leases to BP A. 19 From this point of first

14

Aff. of Christine Mikell iii! 4-11, Ex. pp. 4, 5.

15

Id

16

16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 et. seq.; 18 C.F.R. § 292.207 (regarding the ability to self-certify as a QF).

17

See generally Mikell Aff., iii! 16-36, Ex. pp. 6-10. It is common for qualifying facilities to
transmit or "wheel" their output from the interconnecting utility to a different purchasing utility. See Pub.
Serv. Co. of NH v. NH Elec. Coop., Inc., 83 FERC if 61,224, iii! 61,998-62,000 (1998) (expressly
stating that qualifying facilities have the right to use one utility's transmission facilities to deliver to, and
compel a purchase by, any other utility).
18

See generally Mikell Aff. at if 34, Ex. pp. 9, 10.

19

Mikell Aff., iii! 15-25, Ex. pp. 7, 8.

8

interconnection with the grid, Grouse Creek then intended to secure point-to-point ("PTP")
transmission service from BPA, for delivery to Idaho Power. 20
Grouse Creek's efforts to secure interconnection rights with Raft River/BP A included a
BP A Feasibility Study (September, 2008), a BPA System Impact Study (September, 2009) a
BP A Facilities Study (March, 2010), and a signed three-party Interconnection Agreement
(March 31, 2010) between Grouse Creek, BPA and Raft River. 21 These interconnection studies,
which cost Grouse Creek a total of $116,500, consistently indicated that there was 93 megawatts
(MW) of electrical transfer capacity available for Grouse Creek on the BPA/Raft River system
for delivery to Idaho Power. 22 Grouse also progressed through the separate process with BPA
necessary to secure PTP transmission service to Idaho Power's Minidoka substation. 23
Grouse Creek first began formal power purchase agreement (PP A) negotiations with
Idaho Power in February of 2010 for a single 55 to 65 MW wind farm. 24 Idaho Power told
Grouse Creek that Grouse Creek would need to reserve firm PTP transmission on BPA's system
before the Idaho Power would determine whether Idaho Power had available transmission
capacity ("ATC") sufficient to accommodate the Grouse Creek generation. 25 Consequently, on
June 30, 2010, Grouse Creek paid BPA another $76,000 to study PTP transmission service for
this first leg of the transmission journey, from Grouse Creek to Idaho Power. Bonneville
confirmed the availability of PTP transmission service, but also requested a Performance
Assurance deposit of $794,3 76 from Grouse Creek in order to hold that transmission capacity for
20

Id. iii! 26-33, Ex. pp. 8, 9.

21

Id. iii! 15-25, Ex. pp. 7, 8.

22

Id. iii! 17, 19, Ex. pp. 6, 7.

23

Id.

24

Reconsideration Reply Legal Brief of Grouse Creek, p. 8, R. p. 165.

25

Mikell Aff. at ii 34, Ex. pp. 9, 10.

iii! 26-33, Ex. pp 8, 9.

9

Grouse Creek

26

.

Grouse Creek declined to make this substantial deposit with BPA, not yet even

knowing whether once that power was delivered to Idaho Power, what that delivery would cost. 27
Grouse Creek objected to Idaho Power's imposed "chicken and egg dilemma" 28 of
having to pay more than three-quarters of a million dollars to BPA, before Idaho Power would
commence studies to determine Idaho Power's cost to accept Grouse Creek power. As explained
below, this "chicken and egg" stand-off would remain unresolved for six months, until
December 2, 2010, when Idaho Power finally agreed to remove the requirement that Grouse
Creek had to first secure BPA transmission rights before Idaho Power would sign PPAs with
Grouse Creek. 29
In late June of 2010, Grouse Creek also notified Idaho Power that it would not be
pursuing a single larger wind project and instead would pursue two separate 10 average
megawatt ("aMW") wind projects. 30 On July 14, 2010, Grouse Creek formally requested that
Idaho Power provide two draft PP As and again requested that Idaho Power begin the A TC
transmission study of its own system, to move the Grouse Creek energy from its point of
delivery/receipt to Idaho Power's load. 31 To help accelerate the ATC study, Grouse Creek's
26

Id. at if 27, Ex. p. 8.

27

Id. at if 40, Ex. p. 10.

28

See Ex. p. 22, Exhibit A to Mikell Aff., Idaho Power March 2, 2010, response to Grouse Creek,
wherein Idaho Power states that "before [Idaho Power] will even accept an application requesting review
of available transmission capacity on the Idaho Power system" Grouse Creek must have "secured
Interconnection from the host utility (Raft river) and ... verified with the transmitting entities(s) (BPA)
that firm transmission for the full nameplate rating is available to the Idaho Power interconnection point."
29

See confirmation letter from counsel for Grouse Creek to Idaho Power dated December 2, 2010.

Ex. p. 167.
30

In its implementation of PURPA, the Commission had, through a series of prior orders,
established a regime where QF projects less than 10 average megawatts (aMW) were entitled to standard
or published avoided cost rates, but projects larger than 10 aMW had to negotiate a rate, based on the
utility's integrated resource planning model, an exercise that resulted in rates for wind projects
significantly less than the published avoided cost rate.
31

Mikell Aff. at iii! 43-45, Ex. pp. 11, 12.

10

July 14, 2010, letter also explained: "Per your suggestion, [Grouse Creek] went ahead and
confirmed on [Idaho Power's Open Access Same Time Information System website] to the best
of our ability that there is [transmission] capacity from Minidoka Substation to Treasure Valley
for Idaho Power to obtain Network Service on behalf of our Qualifying Facilities." 32 Still, Idaho
Power continued to delay the contract negotiating process by failing to provide PP As, and by
failing to start the A TC transmission studies. 33 By letters dated October 1, 2010, Grouse Creek
strongly objected to the continuing delays, and to any further delays in Idaho Power commencing
ATC studies and in providing draft PPAs. 34 Yet almost a month later, on October 27, 2010
Idaho Power had not responded to the Grouse Creek's October 1 letters, so counsel for Grouse
Creek sent follow-up letters again asking for draft PPAs. 35
On November 1, 2010, Idaho Power, for the first time, provided draft PPAs to Grouse
Creek. 36 These draft PP As were largely form agreements containing material terms and
conditions established and controlled by prior Idaho PUC orders, and to which Grouse Creek had
already expressed its acceptance of such common terms. 37 However, Idaho Power also notified
Grouse Creek that Idaho Power had yet to initiate the A TC studies38 , again reiterating that

32

Id. Ex. p. 43.

33

For example, an Idaho Power representative stated on July 21, 2010, "I have not been able to
submit the TSR [transmission services request]. Been getting buy in from various people, looks like I will
probably be filing the TSR sometime next week." See Mikell Aff. at if 46, Ex. p. 12 and Idaho Power
email, July 21, 2010, Ex. p. 57; see also Idaho Power's June 29, 2010, email stating its routine process
was to "not develop a draft agreement for a particular project until the interconnection and transmission is
pinned down" Ex. p. 58.
34

Id. at iii! 52-57, Ex. pp. 13, 14; see also Exhibit G to Mikell Aff., Ex. pp. 79-85.

35

Id. at if 58, Ex. p. 14; see also Exhibit H to Mikell Aff., Ex. pp. 96, 97.

36

Mikell Aff. at iii! 59, 60, Ex. p. 14; see also letter from Idaho Power to Grouse Creek Ex. pp. 99-

156.
37

See Id. Ex pp. 79 - 83 (containing Grouse Creek's October 1, 2010 letters expressing agreement
to the standards terms and even listing the prior Commission orders governing such transactions).
38

Id. at iii! 59-60, Ex. p. 14; see also Ex. pp. 99-156.
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Grouse Creek "[must] secure firm transmission capacity across all required transmission paths
[i.e., BPA] to the point of delivery on the Idaho Power electrical system." 39
On November 5, 2010, Idaho Power, by motion before the Commission, requested an
immediate lowering of the eligibility threshold for wind projects seeking the published avoided
cost rate, from 10 aMW down to 100 kilowatts ("kW"). 40 This filing and its request for
immediate relief would have resulting in denying Grouse Creek access to the published avoided
cost rate that was fundamental to the financial viability of the Grouse Creek projects. As a
consequence, on November 8, 2010 Grouse Creek filed complaints against Idaho Power at the
Commission, alleging, among other things, that Idaho Power had acted in bad faith in its
insistence that Grouse Creek complete and secure its interconnection and transmission rights
prior to executing the PPAs. 41
On November 19, 2010, Idaho Power and Grouse Creek agreed to stay the Complaint
cases and proceed to execute standard QF wind PPAs containing the published avoided cost
rates. Idaho Power also agreed to remove its requirement that Grouse Creek obligate itself to a
final BP A PIP transmission agreement, prior to Grouse Creek knowing Idaho Power's A TC
costs assignable to Grouse Creek, and whether the Idaho PUC would approve the PPAs with
Idaho Power.

42

On November 24, 2010, Idaho Power sent Grouse Creek a letter requesting that

Grouse Creek "fill in or correct any of the project specific information" in the previously
39

Id.

40

A kilowatt (kW) is 1,000 watts, and a megawatt (MW) is 1,000 kilowatts. A 10 MW electrical
project, generating 100% of the time, would also be a 10 average MW (aMW) sized project. Wind
projects do not generate all the time however, so a 21 MW wind project that is generating approximately
30% of the month is a 10 aMW sized project.

41

Mikell Aff. at iii! 67-69, Ex. pp. 15, 16. See also Grouse Creek's Motion to Augment Agency
Record by including the Complaints, which at the date of submittal of this memorandum, the Court had
yet to rule.
42

Id. at if 70, Ex. p. 16.

12

provided PPAs and "return the draft[ s] to Idaho Power so that the Company can then initiate the
Sarbanes-Oxley contract approval process and generate executable draft[s] for signatures." 43
Grouse Creek returned the completed drafts on December 2, 2010, 44 and on December 9,
2010, asked Idaho Power whether it would be OK if the start dates for energy production could
be slipped by six months, in order to accommodate the delayed start ofldaho Power's ATC
studies.

45

Thus, by December 9, 2010, all material PPA terms and conditions had been finalized.
Formal execution copies of the Agreements were finalized by Idaho Power and presented to
counsel for Grouse Creek on December 16, 2010 (but without Idaho Power's signature), and
counsel for Grouse Creek mailed the executable PPAs to Grouse Creek's development manager
who was not located in Boise. 46 Grouse Creek signed on December 21, 2010, and sent the
Agreements back to Idaho Power; Idaho Power executed the Agreements on December 28, 2010,
and filed them with the Commission on December 29, 2010.

D.

COURSE OF IDAHO

47

PUC PROCEEDINGS.

The Idaho PUC issued a preliminary order on December 3, 2010, declining Idaho
Power's request to immediately reduce the QF eligibility cap for published avoided cost rates,
but announcing that that its eventual "decision regarding the 'Joint Motion' to reduce the
published avoided cost eligibility cap shall become effective on December 142010."48 On
February 7, 2011, the Idaho PUC then reduced (from 10 aMW to 100 kW49 ) the eligibility cap
43

Id. at if 71, Ex. p. 16; see also Ex. pp. 158-164.

44

Id. at if 72, Ex. p. 16; see also letter from Grouse Creek of December 2, 2010, along with attached
Agreements, Ex. pp. 167-280.
45

Id. at if 75, Ex. p. 17; see also email from Grouse Creek Counsel to Idaho Power on December 9,
2010, Ex. p. 515.
46

Id. at iii! 78-79, Ex. pp. 17, 18. See also Grouse Creek Comments, March 24, 2011, R. p. 176.

47

Id. at iii! 76-80, Ex. pp. 17, 18.
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for wind and solar QFs to receive published avoided cost rates, 50retroactive to December 14,
2010. Wind projects exceeding 100 kW were no longer entitled to published avoided cost rates,
unless such projects had vested in the published rates prior to December 14, 2010.
On June 8, 2011, the Idaho PUC rejected the Agreements between Idaho Power and
Grouse Creek, on the grounds that, "[b]ecause the size of each of those wind projects exceeds
100 kW, they are not eligible to receive published rate contracts." 51 In that order, the
Commission announced a new "bright line rule" that "a Firm Energy Sales Agreement/Power
Purchase Agreement must be executed, i.e., signed by both parties to the agreement, prior to the
effective date of the change in eligibility criteria. 52 " That date for Grouse Creek, the Commission
found, was December 28, 2010, the date when Idaho Power signed the Agreements. Because
neither party had executed the Agreements prior to December 14, 2010, the Commission held
that "the rates contained in the Agreements do not comply with [the Idaho PUC's February 7
Order]." 53 Grouse Creek filed a Petition for Reconsideration and on July 27, 2012. The Idaho
PUC, in Order No. 32299, 54 denied that petition and affirmed its original holding in Order No.

48

IPUC Order No. 32131, pp. 5, 6, IPUC Case No. GNR-E-10-04, (December 2010) In the Matter
of the Joint Petition to Acijust the Published Avoided Cost Rate Eligibility Cap.

49

See footnote 19 for a description of a kilowatt. To make an apples-to-apples comparison of
average megawatts to kilowatts for an "average" wind project, the wind avoided cost availability cap for
published rates was reduced from 21,000 kW down to 100 kW, as of December 14, 2010.

50

IPUC Order No. 32176 at p. 9, Id IPUC Case No. GNR-E-10-4.

51

IPUC Order No. 3225, June 8, 2010, R. p. 229.

52

Id R. p. 230.

53

Id.

54

R. p. 252, et. seq.
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32257. On September 7, 2011, Grouse Creek timely filed a notice of appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court.
Concurrent with these proceedings, a separate group of wind QFs, called the Cedar Creek
Wind QFs, filed a petition for enforcement against the Idaho PUC at FERC, pursuant to
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h). 55 As it had in the Grouse Creek case, the Idaho PUC also applied the
same "bright line rule" requiring a fully executed contract, to reject the Cedar Creek PP As with
another Idaho utility, Rocky Mountain Power. On October 4, 2011, FERC issued a declaratory
order determining that the Idaho PU C's "bright line" rule was in a violation of PURPA and
FERC's implementing regulations. FERC concluded that the IPUC had failed to recognize that
"a legally enforceable obligation may be incurred before the formal memorialization of a
contract to writing." 56
The parties to this appeal thus requested, and this Court granted, a stay of appeal and
remand back to the Idaho PUC, to allow the Commission to take into account FERC's Cedar
Creek ruling. In that Idaho PUC Remand case Grouse Creek asserted that it was entitled to the
pre-December 14, 2010, published avoided cost rates because, like Cedar Creek, Grouse Creek's
legally enforceable obligation with Idaho Power was established before December 14, 2010.
Specifically, Grouse Creek asserted that its legally enforceable obligation was established no
later than December 9, 2010 - the date by which the Grouse Creek projects finalized their inservice dates, had returned Idaho Power's proposed contracts to Idaho Power, and had agreed to
all of the terms therein. The Idaho PUC Staff agreed that Grouse Creek had established a "legally
enforceable obligation" as of December 9, stating in its brief to the Idaho PUC the following:

55

See Cedar Creek, 137 FERC if 61,006.

56

Id. at if 36.
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Based on a reasonable interpretation of the facts in this case, and the actions of
both the projects and Idaho Power, Staff believes that a legally enforceable
obligation was incurred no later than December 9, 2010-the date upon which the
projects modified their on-line dates. At that point in time, the projects had
returned contracts to Idaho Power and agreed to all of the standard terms,
including the delay liquidated damages provision. Negotiations had taken place
since early 2010 and the projects had taken sufficient action to show that they had
committed themselves to sell electricity to Idaho Power. Entitlement to publish
avoided cost rates changed for wind and solar projects on December 14, 2010.
Because a legally enforceable obligation was created no later than December 9,
2010, the Grouse Creek projects are entitled to the published avoided cost rate in
effect before December 14, 2010. 57
On September 7, 2012, the Idaho PUC issued its Order on Remand, 58 for the third time
rejecting the Grouse Creek Agreements, again on the basis that the Agreements were not signed
until after December 14, 2010. In a modification to its previously established 'execution-date'
"bright-line" rule, the Idaho PUC held that "When a contract has been entered into by the parties
and submitted for approval, there is no need for a determination regarding any other legally
enforceable obligation." 59 As the Agreements noted that their "effective date" was December
28, 2010, the Commission opined that it need look no further than "the four corners of the
Agreements" 60 and that Grouse Creek was ineligible for pre-December 14, 2014 published rates.
Finally addressing FERC's Cedar Creek decision, the Idaho PUC said that such a
Declaratory Order was "not binding" on the Commission; that the Idaho PUC doubted "whether
FERC understood" the Idaho PUC's basis for rejecting the Cedar Creek contracts; that Grouse

57

Staff Legal Brief, Case No. IPC-E-10-61 et al. (Feb. 6, 2012) at 5. R. p. 315 (emphasis added).

58

IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 346, et. seq.

59

Id. R. p. 358.

60

Id. R. p. 359.
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Creek, unlike Cedar Creek, has not petitioned FERC for PURPA enforcement; and that Grouse
Creek's facts differed from Cedar Creek facts. 61
On October 19, 2012, Grouse Creek timely filed an amended notice of appeal, requesting
inclusion in the record of materials filed during the remand proceedings and asserting a new
issue on appeal relative to the Idaho PUC's order on remand. 62 Additionally, on January 15,
2013, Grouse Creek filed a petition for enforcement with FERC, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824a3(h). As of the date of this submittal that petition is still pending at FERC. 63

IV.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the Idaho PUC' s decision that Grouse Creek had failed to establish a

legally enforceable obligation before December 14, 2010, is an improper and illegal
implementation of PURPA. Attorney's fees are sought with respect to this issue.
2.

Whether the Idaho PUC's decision that Grouse Creek had failed to establish a

legally enforceable obligation before December 14, 2010, is a violation of Idaho law, is an
arbitrary and capricious departure from prior Commission Orders and Idaho case law
establishing grandfathering rules and rights to prior QF rates, and is unsupported by the record.
Attorney's fees are sought with respect to this issue.
3.

Whether the Commission's Order No. 32635 is arbitrary and capricious and in

violation of controlling federal law, PURPA and FERC' s regulations, including but not limited
to 18 C.F.R. § 292.301 (b), because the PPAs contained agreed-to rates, terms and conditions
between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power.

61

Id. R. p. 357.

62

Id. R. pp. 364-368.

63

See FERC Docket Nos. EL13-39-000, QFl 1-32-001, QFl 1-33-001
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V.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Grouse Creek seeks an award of attorney fees with respect to Issues Nos. land 2, based
on LC. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), and I.A.R. 41, and in conformance with I.A.R. 35. The bases
for a claim of attorney fees are discussed in Article VIII below.

VI.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Idaho Constitution gives this Court jurisdiction to review decisions of the Idaho
Public Utilities Commission.

64

LC.§ 61-629 provides that a review on appeal from a

Commission's order "shall not be extended further than to determine whether the commission
has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order appealed from
violates any right of the appellant under the constitution of the United States or the state of
Idaho."
Regarding questions of fact, the Court's review is limited to whether the Idaho PUC's
findings are "supported by substantial, competent evidence. " 65 A Commission's findings of fact
will be sustained "unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against its conclusion,
or that the evidence is strong and persuasive that the Commission abused its discretion." 66 In
regularly pursuing its authority the Commission must also enter finding of fact that are "based on
competent and substantial evidence" and it must "set forth its reasoning in a rational manner."

64

Idaho Const. art. V, § 9.

65

A. W. Brown v. Idaho Power Co., 121Idaho812, 815, 828 P.2d 841, 844 (1992).

66

Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 376, 597 P.2d 1058, 1066

67

(1979).
67

Wash. Water Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 101 Idaho 567, 575, 617 P. 2d 1242, 1250

(1980)
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Concerning questions of law, the review on appeal "is limited to whether the Idaho
Public Utilities Commission regularly pursued its authority." 68 Factors considered by the Idaho
PUC that "are consistent with the FERC regulations in determining avoided costs" are sufficient
to "establish[] that the IPUC regularly pursued its authority and that its findings are supported by
substantial and competent evidence. " 69

VII.
A.

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE RULING OF THE IDAHO PUC DETERMINING THAT
GROUSE CREEK HAD FAILED TO EST AB LISH A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE OBLIGATION
PRIOR TO DECEMBER 14, 2010, FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH HOLDING IS A VIOLATION
OF PURP A AND FERC's RULINGS UNDER PURPA

1.

Legally Enforceable Obligations Under PURPA

Regulations promulgated by FERC clearly establish that a QF "shall have the option ...
[t]o provide energy or capacity pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation over a specified
term, in which case the rates for such purchases shall, at the option of the qualifying facility
exercised prior to the beginning of the term, be based on ... the avoided costs calculated at the

time the obligation is incurred''. 70 These regulations clearly mandate the right of a QF to sell
[i.e., to 'put'] power to a utility at avoided cost rates arising at the time a legally enforceable
obligation is established by the QF, umelated to whether and when a written contract is fully or
partially signed between the utility and the QF developer.
FERC has most recently explained this rule in Cedar Creek, where it stated that "a QF,
by committing itself to sell to an electric utility, also commits the electric utility to buy from the
QF; these commitments result either in contracts or in non-contractual, but binding, legally

68

Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 128 Idaho 624, 631, 917 P.2d 781, 788
( 1996) (Rosebud II).
69

Rosebud II, 128 Idaho at 632, 917 P.2d at 789.

70

18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2). (emphasis added).
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enforceable obligations." 71 FERC explained that "a legally enforceable obligation may be
incurred before the formal memorialization of a contract to writing." 72 FERC noted:
Courts have recognized that negotiations regarding terms that parties to the
negotiations intend to become a finalized or written contract, may in some
circumstances result in legally enforceable obligations of those parties
notwithstanding the absence of a writing. 73
FERC also emphasized "that the phrase legally enforceable obligation is broader than simply a
contract between a utility and a QF and that the phrase is used to prevent an electric utility from
avoiding its PURPA obligations by refusing to sign a contract, or as here, from delaying the
signing of a contract, so that a later and lower avoided cost is applicable." 74
Yet, despite this clear directive, the Idaho PUC has three times concluded that because
the Agreements between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek were not signed and dated before
December 14, 2010, there was no legally enforceable obligation in effect prior to that date.

2.

There is no difference between an Execution Date Bright-Line Rule and an
Effective Date Rule, and both violate PURPA

In its first and second Grouse Creek Orders, the Idaho PUC said "the primary issue to be
determined was whether the Agreements

which utilize the published avoided cost rate

were

executed before the eligibility cap for published rates was lowered to 100 kW on December 14,
2010." 75 To resolve this "primary issue," the Idaho PUC adopted a "bright line rule" requiring

71

See Cedar Creek, 137 FERC

72

Id.

at~

~

61,006

at~

32.

36.

73

Id. at~ 36 n.62, citing, Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.Jd 401,
407-09 (4th Cir. 2002); Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Services, Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 547-50 (2d
Cir. 1998); Miller Constr. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187, 188-190, 697 P.2d 1201, 1202-04
(Idaho 1985)
74

Id.

75

IPUC Order No. 32257, June 8, 2011, R. p. 229 (emphasis added).

at~

36.
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that in order for the Agreements to be based on the published rates, the Agreements had to have
been fully executed prior to the December 14, 2010 change in the eligibility cap. 76
Subsequently, FERC in Cedar Creek held that the Idaho PUC's "bright-line" rule was
illegal and a clear violation of FERC regulations entitling a QF to rates based on avoided costs
calculated at the time the legally enforceable obligation is incurred. 77 In rejecting the Idaho
PUC's bright-line rule of full-execution, FERC said: "when a state limits the methods through
which a legally enforceable obligation may be created to only a fully-executed contract, the
state's limitation is inconsistent with PURPA and our regulations implementing PURPA." 78 As
earlier noted, FERC adopted the term "legally enforceable obligation" rather than the term
"contract" to prevent a utility from refusing to sign a contract, or delaying the signing of a
contract until after rates are lower. 79 Following Cedar Creek, FERC has twice reaffirmed its
position that the Idaho PUC's reliance on its 'fully executed' "bright line" rule was "inconsistent
with PURPA and our [FERC's] regulations implementing PURPA, particularly section
292.304(d)(2)." 80
Moreover, FERC's regulation and rulings are entirely consistent with the principles of
contract law. "[A]n agreement is not unenforceable merely because it is subject to the approval

76

Id. at p. 10, R. p. 230.

77

137 FERC at~ 61,006, ~~ 30 - 32, citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii), "Each qualifying facility
shall have the option ... to provide energy or capacity pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation for the
delivery of energy or capacity over a specified term, in which case the rates for such purchase shall, at the
option of the qualifying facility exercised prior to the beginning of the specified term, be based on either
(i) the avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery; or (ii) the avoided costs calculated at the time the
obligation is incurred." (emphasis added).
78

Id.

at~

35; citing FERC Order No. 69, FERC Stats &

79

Id.

at~

36.

80

Regs,~

30, 128 at 30,880 (1980) .

Rainbow Ranch Wind, LLC and Rainbow West Wind, LLC, 139 FERC ~ 61,007 at~ 23 (April 30,
2012); see also Murphy Flat Power, LLC, 141 FERC ~ 61, 145 (2012) (reaching the same conclusion).
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of a formal contract." 81 In the PURPA context, "the obligation to purchase power is imposed by
law on a utility; it is not voluntarily assumed." 82 Idaho law does not require a memorialization of
an agreement to a formal writing as a precondition for the agreement to be legally enforceable even if such a requirement could overcome FERC' s rule in this particular context. 83
In First National Mortgage, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that a "Final Proposal"
was binding because it clearly stated that its terms "are hereby accepted by the parties subject
only to approval of the terms and conditions of a formal agreement." 84 The circumstances here

are indistinguishable. After waiting months to even obtain Idaho Power's draft contracts, Grouse
Creek had fully committed itself to all material terms of the PPAs prior to December 14, 2010.
The letters exchanged prior to December 14, 2010 evidence that Grouse Creek intended to
obligate itself subject only to Idaho Power's final, Sarbanes-Oxley Act approval of the
agreements. 85
Responding to Cedar Creek and Rainbow Ranch, the Idaho PUC's third Order on
Remand reconfigured the 'execution date' "bright-line" rule into an 'effective-date' rule, wherein
the "effective date" of an Agreement, if one is noted in a PPA, is the only factor to be looked at
in determining the date a legally obligation is established. This change in bright-line rule
terminology - from 'execution date' to 'effective-date' - is a distinction without a difference.
In essence, the Idaho PUC held that the prior established legally enforceable obligation
date locked-in by the QF shifts to the notational date inserted by the utility on page 1 of a PPA,

81

First Nat'! Mortgage Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Trust, 63 l F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011).

82

Snow Mt. Pine Co. v. Maudlin, 84 Or. App. 590, 599, 734 P.2d 1366, 1370 (1987).

83

See Evco Sound & Electronics, Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 148 Idaho 357, 365, 223 P.3d 740, 748
(2009); Miller Const. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187, 188-89; 697 P.2d 1201, 1202-04 (1985).
84

631 F.3d at 1065 (emphasis in original).

85

Mikell Aff. at Exhibit J.
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and that the QF "accept[s] that" legal consequence. 86 In the Commission's own words, "When a
contract has been entered into by the parties and submitted for approval, there is no need for a
determination regarding any other legally enforceable obligation." 87 As the Agreements'
"effective dates" were December 28, 2010, the Commission opined that it need look no further
than "the four comers of the Agreements" 88 to determine that Grouse Creek was ineligible for
pre-December 14, 2014, published rates. In effect, the Commission ruled that Grouse Creek had
waived its PURPA/federal entitlement to published rates as of the date it had a previously
established a legally enforceable obligation, because Idaho Power had hand-written in the
numeral "28" on page 1 of the Agreements, a ministerial act Grouse Creek had no control over.
To the contrary, Cedar Creek stands clearly for the principle that "executed contracts"
and "legally enforceable obligations" are not the same thing and that a legally enforceable
obligation is not nullified once a written contract is signed. 89 It is antithetical to think that the act
of memorializing a legally enforceable obligation in a subsequent contract can extinguish that
same legally enforceable obligation. Cedar Creek clearly rejected this 'form-trumps-substance'
application when it said "Indeed, Commission [FERC] regulations and Order No. 69 expressly
use the terms "contract" and "legally enforceable obligation" in the disjunctive to demonstrate
that a legally enforceable obligation includes, but is not limited to, a contract." 90 As FERC
noted in Cedar Creek, "[A] QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric utility, also commits
the electric utility to buy from the QF," thereby creating the legally enforceable obligation.
86

IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 359.

87

Id. R. p. 358 (emphasis added).

88

Id. R. p. 359.

89

137 FERC ~ 61,006

90

Id.

91

Id.

at~

at~

35.

32.
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91

Grouse Creek was finally able to "lock-in" Idaho Power to legally enforceable
obligations, no later than December 9, 2010, when it had provided all the necessary material
project information to Idaho Power and unequivocally accepted all the material terms and
conditions of the Agreements drafted by Idaho Power. The Idaho PUC staff agreed. Yet,
according to the Commission, when Grouse Creek was finally presented with a written
memorialization of its legally enforceable obligation, the ministerial act by Idaho Power of
signing the Agreements and hand-writing an "effective date" that was after December 14, 2010,
voided Grouse Creek's right to pre-December 14 rates. 92
In Cedar Creek, FERC said, with respect to the Idaho PUC's 'execution-date' "bright
line" rule, that PURPA does not give states "unlimited discretion to limit the ways a legally
enforceable obligation is incurred." 93 The same admonition applies equally to the Idaho PUC's
shift from a PPA's 'execution date' to its 'effective date.' This Court clearly articulated in
Rosebud II that when the Idaho PUC's implementation of PURPA is "consistent with the FERC
regulations" then the Commission has "regularly pursued its authority." 94 Rosebud II also stands
for the corollary, that when the Idaho PUC clearly and openly refuses to implement PURPA
regulations in Idaho, as it has been specifically instructed by FERC to so do, the Commission is
not "regularly pursuing its authority." 95

92

"The legally enforceable obligations of the parties are contained within the four comers
of the Agreements." IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 359.
93

137 FERC ~ 61,006 at~ 35.

94

See Rosebud II, 128 Idaho at 632, 917 P.2d at 789.

95

LC.§ 61-629.
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3.

Requiring a QF Developer to Successfully Conclude a Complaint Proceeding,
as an Alternative to a Signed Contract, is a Violation of a Developer's Right
to a Legally Enforceable Obligation under PURP A

Perhaps as justification to avoid having to follow Idaho PUC Staff's recommendation in
the remand case to approve the Grouse Creek Agreements "because a legally enforceable

obligation was created no later than December 9, 2010"96 , the Idaho PUC determined in its
Order on Remand that a legally enforceable obligation cannot be created on a date other than
contract's effective date, unless there is no agreed upon effective date between the parties97 and
the QF successfully pursues a complaint that a contract memorializing that obligation would
exist, but for the conduct of the utility. 98
To the contrary, there is nothing in the FERC regulations that requires the filing of a
complaint and/or the culmination of complaint proceedings, in order to establish the date of a
legally enforceable obligation, or that remotely stands for the proposition that if a QF elects to
negotiate and executes a contract, a legally enforceable obligation cannot be created prior to
contract finalization and execution. It could not be clearer from Cedar Creek, 99 Rainbow

Ranch 100 and Murphy Flat 101 that a legally enforceable obligation can be created with or without

96

Id. R. p. 315. (emphasis added).

97

"[T]he Commission did not have to determine whether a legally enforceable obligation arose
because the parties entered into a written agreement ... [with an] effective date of December 28, 2010."
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 362.

98

"[I]f the utility is failing to negotiate or refusing to enter into a contract with a QF, the QF can file
a complaint with this Commission, at which time the Commission will make a determination as to
whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose." Id. R. p. 358. The Commission recognized that
Grouse Creek "filed a complaint on November 8, 2010." Id. at R. p. 359. However, the Commission then
determined that because the parties were able to voluntarily negotiate agreements, the complaint process
did not proceed and conclude, and as a consequence, "a [Commission] determination regarding a legally
enforceable obligation was never triggered." Id. at R. p. 360.
99

Id. 137 FERC

~

61,006.

100

Id. 139 FERC

~

61,007.

101

Id. 141 FERC ~ 61,145.
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a contract, before execution of that contract, and separate and apart from whether the QF chose
to execute a contract or file a complaint. In short, the date by which a legally enforceable
obligation arises is no more driven by whether a utility signs than by when it signs.
Put simply, PURPA, FERC regulations and FERC rulings interpreting those regulations
look to the date on which a legally enforceable obligation arose, rather than when the related
contract is signed or is nominally effective. PURPA simply establishes the rights of QFs to sell
power to utilities at avoided cost, and acknowledges that utilities have great incentive to refuse to
negotiate and to delay negotiations, especially when there is an approaching date of significant
price/eligibility reduction. In establishing the legally enforceable obligation standard under
PURPA, FERC recognizes that when a utility is simultaneously negotiating with a QF, while
also having every incentive to stall negotiations, the date establishing a legally enforceable
obligation cannot be left in the hands of the utility. Yet, that is what the Idaho PUC has
determined and the error that requires reversal by this Court.
B.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE HOLDING OF THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION THAT GROUSE CREEK DID NOT ESTABLISH LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT RIGHTS BEFORE DECEMBER 14, 2010, FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH
HOLDING IS AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD

1.

The Commission's Decision Denying the Grouse Creek Agreements Was
Arbitrary and Capricious, and a Violation of Its Previously Established
Avoided Cost Grandfathering Criteria
a.

The History of Grandfathering: This Court has long recognized that

"[c]onferment of grandfathered status on qualifying facility is essentially an IPUC finding that a
legally enforceable obligation to sell power existed by a given date."

102

102

Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 128 Idaho 609, 624, 917 P.2d 766, 781
(1996) (Rosebud I).
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In the 1990s the Idaho PUC faced several instances of changing avoided cost rates
and QF developers claiming a grandfathered right to the previously higher rate. 103 As a
consequence, the Commission established a two-part grandfathering test: either the QF and the
utility signed a contract, or the QF must, before the date of rate change, "file[] a meritorious
complaint alleging that the project was mature and that the developer had attempted, and failed,
to negotiate a contract with the utility". 104 In A. W Brown this Court affirmed the Idaho PU C's
decision that Brown was not entitled to grandfathered avoided cost rates, because Brown "did
not filed a meritorious complaint with the PUC" before the date of the avoided cost rate change,
"did not 'pursue a power contract with some diligence,' nor did Brown make a 'comprehensive
binding offer,"' and that "Brown did not show that it was ready, willing and able to sign a
contract' while the [prior] rates were in effect." 105
In 2005 the Idaho PUC revised its grandfathering test to no longer require the
"filing of a meritorious complaint, " replacing it with a more balanced test focusing on the
substance of whether the QF was "ready, willing and able," to perform. Thus, the Idaho PUC
defined what constituted a grandfathered right to a legally enforceable obligation in IPUC Case
No. IPC-E-05-22 106

IPUC Order Nos. 29839, 29851, and 29872 107

which, in a regulatory

103

Changing the avoided cost rate, and changing the eligibility cap to avoided cost rates, are both a
"rate change" in their substantive effect on a developer. To say a change in eligibility to rates is not a rate
change is again a distinction without a difference. Any grandfathering criteria that would appropriately be
applied to a "rate change" should equally apply to an "eligibility-to-rates" that are changed. A contrary
assertion would ignore the reality of what the Commission is otherwise doing to affect QFs. By changing
the eligibility cap rules, the Commission is by definition changing the rates that QFs are paid.
104

A. W. Brown, 121 Idaho at 81 7, 828 P .2d at 846 ( 1992).

105

Id. citing Empire Lumber Co. v. Wash. Water Power Co., 114 Idaho 191, 193, 755 P.2d 1229,
1231 (1988) (Dismissal of Empire's complaint was appropriate because Empire had failed to demonstrate
it was "ready, willing and able to sign a contract.")
106

IPUC Case No. IPC-E-05-22, (2005) In the Matter of Suspending Idaho Power's PURPA
Obligation.
107

E.g., IPUC Order No. 29839 at 9-10 (2005).
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action substantively identical to this case, also lowered the posted rate eligibility cap from
10 aMW to 100 kW.
Specifically, the Commission established the following grandfathering test for
entitlement to previous avoided cost rates: First, the Idaho PUC would look to: "(1) submittal of
a signed power purchase agreement to the utility, or (2) submittal to the utility of a completed
Application for Interconnection Study and payment of fee."

108

Second, the Commission would

look at the following "other indicia of substantial progress and project maturity," to determine
whether "QF projects in the negotiating queue on that date" were entitled to a power purchase
agreement: "(i) a wind study demonstrating a viable site for the project, (ii) a signed contract for
wind turbines, (iii) arranged financing for the project, and/or (iv) related progress on the facility
permitting and licensing path." 109 The purpose of the indicative criteria was not to create a rigid
checklist, but to "recognize and not discount the considerable time, effort and energy expended
by some QFs in developing their projects" and to approve QF projects that have reached a level
of project maturity on the basis of which they reasonably could be expected to be brought on line
within a reasonable period following contract execution.

110

Applying this new grandfathering criteria to a number of projects, the Idaho PUC
first approved a contract between Idaho Power and Salmon Falls Wind Park LLC, noting that the
project was "sufficiently mature" in its development to justify "grandfathering" status pursuant
to the appropriate criteria, even though both Idaho Power and Salmon Falls Wind signed their

108

IPUC Order No. 29872 at 9.

109

Id. at 8 (quoting IPUC Order No. 29839 at 9-10).

110

Id. at 10-11. The Commission did not require that the QF satisfy each of these indicia, but had
intended only to provide example "criteria that could be looked to assess project maturity." Order No.
29951 at5.
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agreements after the date of a rate change. 111 Similarly, in July 2010, the Commission approved a
QF contract between Idaho Power Company and Cargill, which, although negotiated prior to
March 16, 2010 (the effective date for the change in published avoided cost rates), was not
signed until May 4, 2010, for the reason that Idaho Power's "routine internal approval had not
been completed .... " 112
More importantly, at the same time Grouse Creek was attempting to obligate itself
to published avoided cost rates, the Commission in November 2010, found that a legally
enforceable obligation had been created between Idaho Power and Yellowstone Power, without
evidence of any written correspondence between the parties. In Yellowstone Power Inc. the Idaho
PUC approved a request for grandfathering into [pre March 16, 201 O] published avoided cost
contracts for a contract not executed until July 28, 2010, again recognizing that a QF, without a
signed contract, was able to demonstrate its entitlement to the previously-effective published
avoided cost rates by satisfying other grandfathering criteria. 113 The Idaho PUC approved the
agreement despite "the apparent lack of any written documentation ... evidencing that the terms
of a power purchase agreement were materially complete [before the rate change]" in part
because QF had "familiarity with PURPA projects and the standard terms of Idaho Power's
power purchase agreements." 114
b.

Grandfathering Applied to Grouse Creek: In spite of this well developed

and often (even concurrently) applied grandfathering test, the Idaho PUC's first two rejections of

Ill

IPUC Order No. 29951 at 2, (January 2008) In the Matter of Salmon Falls Wind Park LLC.

114

Id. (emphasis added).
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the Grouse Creek Agreements were based on a newly announced "bright line" rule requiring
fully executed contracts. Then, when FERC rejected this 'execution date' "bright line" rule as
illegal, the Commission changed from an 'execution date' to an "effective date" rule. Neither
rule, however, involves any of the substantive analysis required by PURPA, the Commission's
2005 grandfathering standards, or by this Court's prior decisions regarding the grandfathering of
legally enforceable obligations. Clearly, this June 8, 2011 abandonment of the Commission's
grandfathering test and publication of a new 'execution date' "bright line" rule, and its
metamorphosis into an 'effective date' rule, was an arbitrary and capricious departure from the
Commission's previously well-established grandfathering tests, and of PURPA's rules and
regulations regarding legally enforceable obligations.
c.

The Idaho PUC's Failure to Explain Its Departure from Prior

Grandfathering Rules: It is a basic tenet of administrative law that an agency reversing its prior
policy faces a heightened burden to reverse course. 115 As the Court said in Rosebud I, the Idaho
PUC "must explain the reasoning employed to reach its conclusions in order to ensure that the
IPUC has applied relevant criteria prescribed by statute or its own regulations and thus has not
acted arbitrarily or capriciously." 116 Although the Idaho PUC is "not so rigorously bound by the
doctrine of stare decisis that it must decide all future cases in the same way, 117 it still must
"adequately explain" a deviation from its regulations or prior cases " so that the reviewing court

I 15

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of US., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42,
103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983) ("an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated
to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not
act in the first instance.").
I 16

See Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775.

117

Intermountain Gas Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 97 Idaho 113, 119, 540 P.2d 775, 781

(1975).
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can determine that the decisions are not arbitrary and capricious." 118 In Washington Water
Power, this court said the Idaho PUC "must demonstrate that it has applied the criteria prescribed

by statute and by its own regulations and has not acted arbitrarily or on an ad hoc basis." 119
Synonyms for ad hoc include 'improvised' and 'off-the-cuff.
In this case, the Idaho PUC has failed to adequately explain the basis of
abandoning its 2005 grandfathering tests - which provided a balanced review of the facts and
circumstances - and adopting not one, but two improvised rules seeking the obvious and
intended result of rejecting the Agreements, based on form-over-substance. In spite of its own
Staff recommendation to approve the Grouse Creek Agreements [because Staff concurred that
Grouse Creek had established a legally enforceable obligation as of December 9, 2010]

120

the

Commission walked away from all of its and this Court's prior grandfathering precedents. In
essence, none of the facts involving either Grouse Creek's significant capital investment or
protracted negotiations with Idaho Power mattered. Instead, the Idaho PUC simply found that
"when a contract has been entered into by the parties and submitted for approval, there is no need
for a determination regarding any other legally enforceable obligation." 121 This explanation falls
substantially short of this Court's requirement that the Idaho PUC "adequately explain" its
deviation from prior rulings "so that the reviewing court can determine that the decisions are not
,,122
.
. .
arb1trary
and capnc10us.
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Id.
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Wash. Water Power, 101 Idaho at 575, 617 P.2d at 1250.
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R. p. 315.
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IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 358.
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Id. Intermountain Gas, 97 Idaho 113, 540 P.2d 781.
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2.

The Commission's Findings Of Fact Are Unsupported By The Record, and
Are Therefore Unavailing

Finally, in an effort to buttress its third rejection of the Grouse Creek Agreements on
something other than newly created and mechanically applied rules, the Commission noted that
the "evidence and the conduct of the parties" 123 with respect to three "findings of fact" did not
support Grouse Creek's assertion that a legally enforceable obligation was created on
December 9, 2010. First, the Commission found that Grouse Creek had "failed to name" the
appropriate transmission entity until December 15, 2010, "a day after the eligibility cap was
reduced."

124

Second, the Idaho PUC ruled that Grouse Creek had also "failed to provide a proper

legal description of the project's location" before December 14, 2010. 125 Finally, the
Commission found that Grouse Creek's December 9, 2010, email asking Idaho Power whether it
would be "OK" [or not] to slip the projects' start date indicated that material contract
negotiations were ongoing as of December 15, 2010. 126 None of these three findings are based
on substantial evidence in the record.

a.

The 'Naming' of the Transmission Entity: Concerning the first finding of

fact, the Commission relied exclusively on Idaho Power's brief on Remand asserting that
"Grouse Creek had in previous communications from the Projects had indicated at different
times both BPA and PacifiCorp," 127 which in turn referenced an email from Idaho Power to
Grouse Creek dated December 15, 2010, asking that Grouse Creek [again] confirm the name of

123
124

IPUC Order No. 32635, R. pp. 360, 361.

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id. R. p. 361.

127

Idaho Power Company's Memorandum on Remand, IPUC Case No. IPC-E-10-61, 62 (Feb. 6,
2011) R. p. 307.
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the transmitting entity. Based on this single representation from Idaho Power, the Commission
held that the 'name of the transmitting utility' was still a matter of "active negotiation. 128"
Ignored completely by the Commission in Order No. 32635 was the extensive
record Grouse Creek laid out, where it had on numerous occasions identified BP A as the correct
transmission carrier of energy from the projects to Idaho Power: For examples, see: (i) March 2,
2010, email from Idaho Power to Grouse Creek verifying that BPA will be the transmitting entity
and asking if "the BP A process requires a no- refundable deposit" to start transmission studies; 129
(ii) March 12, 2010, letter from Idaho Power to Grouse Creek stating "we [Idaho Power] have a
pretty good understanding of the Interconnection status and potential BPA solutions we need to
put into motion the process of documenting the various [transmission] requirements;" 130 (iii)
June 16, 2010, Idaho Power Transmission Capacity Application Questionnaire where Required
Item "S" asked the name of the "Transmission Provider" and Grouse Creek answered
"Bonneville Power Administration;" 131 (iv) July 13, 2010, correspondence wherein Grouse
Creek notified Idaho Power that it was downsizing to two separate 10 aMW projects and
resubmitting Idaho Power's Transmission Capacity Application Questionnaire which again
confirmed at Item "S" that "BPA" would be the Transmission Provider;" 132 (v) August 17, 2010,
email from Grouse Creek to Idaho Power stating "Bonneville Power Administration will deliver
the output to an interconnection with your system at the Minidoka Substation in Southern
Idaho;" 133 (vi) October 1, 2010, correspondence from Grouse Creek legal counsel to Idaho
128

See IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 361.

129

Ex. p. 22.

130

Ex. p. 33.

131

Ex. p. 40.

132

Ex. pp. 46, 52.

133

Ex. p. 62.
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Power objecting to Idaho Power's requirement that Grouse Creek secure BPA transmission
service before Idaho Power will sign the PPAs. 134 In addition, (vii) paragraph 7 of the November
8, 2010, Formal Complaints Grouse Creek filed against Idaho Power for refusal to negotiate in
good faith stated that "The Grouse Creek [] project[ s] will ... wheel the output through
Bonneville Power Administration ("BP A") for delivery of the output to Idaho Power's system at
the Minidoka substation." 135
Yet, in spite of this overwhelming evidence having been presented to the Idaho
PUC, 136 the Commission discussed none of it and weighed none of it against Idaho Power's
request from Grouse Creek to again identify the transmitting entity. Instead, the Idaho PUC
grounded its rejection of the Agreements on a finding that material, substantive contract
negotiations "were still in flux" 137 because Idaho Power had to again ask 'who will be the
transmitting utility?'

b.

The Location of the Two Wind Projects: The second finding of fact by the

Idaho PUC - accepting Idaho Power's assertion that Grouse Creek had "failed to provide Idaho
Power a complete location designation" 138 - was equally lacking in evidentiary backing and
contrary to the established record. The only factual support for this Commission finding again
comes from Idaho Power's December 14, 2010 self-serving email to Grouse Creek asking for

134

Ex.pp. 80, 81, 88, 89.

135

See Grouse Creek's Motion to Augment Agency Record to include the Complaints, which at the
date of submittal of this memorandum, the Court had yet to rule. See pages 1189 and p. 1199 of the
Complaints.
136

See Grouse Creek's Reply Legal Brief on Remand, R. p. 343.

137

IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 361.

138

Id. R. p. 360.
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clarification of the property "Sections" for each of the two projects. 139 Grouse Creek admits it
mistakenly left the "section" box blank in the December 2, 2010 draft PP A it sent to Idaho
Power. However, exact site specific information, along with meets-and-bounds property
descriptions, had been provided in writing to Idaho Power on October 1, 2010. 140 In addition,
Grouse Creek had previously provided a sworn affidavit testifying that the two projects were
greater than a mile apart. 141
The fact that Idaho Power asked again on December 14, 2010 for clarification of
property descriptions, because Grouse Creek on one occasion failed to properly 'fill-in-a-blank'
as to the property sections, but twice previously had properly identified the property sections,
does not easily - or at all - lead to the conclusion that the parties were "actively negotiating"
material terms of the Agreements. 142 Again, Commission Order No. 32635 is absent any
discussion and balancing of the evidence presented by Grouse Creek that it had previously
supplied Idaho Power with correct property descriptions and sworn testimony that the projects
were greater than one mile apart, versus Idaho Power's single request for "section" confirmation.

c.

The Date of Commercial Operation: The third finding of fact the

Commission relies on to reject the Agreements is that the Parties were "actively negotiating" 143 a
Commission described "amendment" 144 to the commercial operation date of the projects, because
Grouse Creek, on December 9, 2011 asked if it would be "OK" to delay the start of operation by

139

The Idaho Power email correctly noted the "township", "range" and "county" for the two
projects, but asked again for "section" confirmation. See Ex. p. 517.
140

Ex. pp. 82-83, Ex. pp. 90-92.

141

See Mikell Aff. ifif 4-11, Ex. pp. 4, 5.
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Id R. p. 361.

143
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IPUC Order No. 32635 p, 15, R. p 360.

Id p. 16, R. p. 361.
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six months. 145 Idaho Power waited for six days, again until after December 14, 2010, the day
after the rate eligibility change, to answer this simple question, by saying yes.
Considering that Grouse Creek had a clear PURP A right to tell Idaho Power when
it intends to commence energy deliveries, (i.e., the date on which Idaho Power's legally
enforceable obligation to purchase begins) 146 there was really nothing for Idaho Power to
contemplate, accept or reject, if Grouse Creek was requesting a date change, which in fact, it was
not. It was simply a "process" question by Grouse Creek; whether a date change would affect
Idaho Power's "process" of finalizing and printing the Agreements. But, if the Commission
believed that Grouse Creek was requesting a change in the "start date" for delivering energy
under the Agreements, and if the start date is a material contract term, then it is clear that Grouse
Creek also committed [i.e., "locked-in"] Idaho Power to the Agreements on December 9, 2010,
when it informed Idaho Power that purchases would begin on that date, as Grouse Creek is
legally entitled to do so under PURP A. 147 Idaho PUC staff agrees. 148 As FERC said in Cedar
Creek, [A] QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric utility, also commits the electric utility

to buy from the QF." 149 Idaho Power's reply six days later, on December 16, 2010 was simply a
courtesy acknowledging that the date change would not impact the 'processing' of the
Agreements.
145

The question by Grouse Creek to Idaho Power on December 9, 2010: "[W]hat would be your
reaction if we moved the on line dates from first energy 12/12 and COD 6/13 to first energy 6/13 and
COD 12/14? Would we still be o.k. in the process you have going?" Ex. p. 520. Idaho Power answered on
December 15, 2010 that it "can accept your request" for a change in dates. Ex. p. 522. (emphasis added)
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See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304( d) allowing a QF to require a utility to purchase power "pursuant to a
legally enforceable obligation" with rates established "at the option of the qualifying facility" based on
"the avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.
147

Id.
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Id R. p. 315 ("Staff believes that a legally enforceable obligation was incurred no later than
December 9, 2010-the date upon which the projects modified their on-line dates.")
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137 FERC il 61,006 at il 32.
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d

The Idaho PUC's 3 Findings of Fact Do Not Rest on Substantial Evidence

of the Record: As demonstrated, the overwhelming weight of the evidence clearly establishes
that by December 9, 2010, (i) BPA was to be the transmitting utility, (ii) the Projects' locations
had been correctly communicated to Idaho Power, and (iii) Grouse Creek had committed to a
start date.
As this Court has said, the Idaho PUC's findings of fact must be "based on
substantial, competent evidence." 150 In addition, "the IPUC's findings of fact must be affirmed
unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against the conclusion, or that the
evidence is strong and persuasive that the IPUC has abused its discretion." 151 Finally, "[t]he
IPUC's findings of fact are not to be disturbed on appeal unless this Court concludes that the
IPUC's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence or that the evidence is strong and
persuasive that the IPUC abused its discretion." 152 Contrary to this well established law, the
Commission's three findings of fact were instead based on "mere scintillas" 153 of evidence,
ignoring the weight of the evidence in the record to the contrary.
In International Firefighters this Court said: "The 'substantial evidence rule' is
said to be a 'middle position' which precludes a de nova hearing but which nonetheless requires
a serious review which goes beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity." 154 The

150

Id. Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775. See also Wash. Water Power, 101 Idaho at 575,
617 P.2d at 1250 ("Not only must the Commission make and enter proper findings of fact, but it must set
forth its reasoning in a rational manner.").
151

A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845.
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Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 376, 597 P.2d 1058, 1066
( 1979) (emphasis added).
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Intern 'l Ass 'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 633, 586 P.2d 1346, 1349

(1978).
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Id.
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Court in Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt 155 elaborated on International Firefighters, affirming
that"[ s]uch a review requires more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence in support of the agency's
determination, 156 though "something less than the weight of the evidence." 157 '"Put simply', we
wrote [in International Firefighters] 'the substantial evidence rule requires a court to determine
'whether [the agency's] findings of fact are reasonable.

,,,1

58

In judging the reasonableness of an

agency's findings of fact, "reviewing courts should not 'read only one side of the case and, if
they find any evidence there' sustain the administrative action and ignore the record to the
contrary." 159 Instead, this Court requires that the evidence supporting an agency decision must be
"substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body
of evidence opposed to the [agency's] view." 160
The Idaho PUC based its first two factual findings (transmission entity name and
project locations) on "mere scintillas" of evidence, which were nothing more than post
December 14, 2010, 'seeds-of-doubt' planted by Idaho Power, regarding 'when' contract terms
were finalized. In addition, the Commission neither acknowledged nor discussed the substantial
evidence to the contrary, that there was no legitimate question as to the projects' locations, or
who the transmitting utility was. For example, there is no discussion in Commission Order 32635
as why the seven times Grouse Creek indicated in writing that BPA was to be the transmitting
utility, and the one time Idaho Power said "we understand" that BP A is to be the transmitting
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Idaho State Ins. Fundv. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985).
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Citation omitted.
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Citing Consolo v. FMC, 3 83 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966).
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Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 261, 715 P.2d at 930.
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Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 259, 715 P.2d at 930; quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S. Ct. 456, 459, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951).
160

Id. (emphasis added).
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utility, were of substantially less evidentiary weight than Idaho Power's eleventh hour request
asking for clarification of the name of the transmitting utility. Nor could the Commission
reasonable conclude that the operation date of the projects was also in question, because Idaho
Power waited from December 9 until December 16 to respond to Grouse Creek question of it
being "OK" to slip the operation dates.
Plainly, the Idaho PUC's findings "were made upon evidence which clearly does
not support" such findings, and "is an arbitrary act against which courts afford relief." 161 It is
evident from a reading of the entirety of Order No. 3263 5 that the Idaho PUC' s rejections of the
Grouse Creek Agreements had very little to do with Grouse Creek facts, and was primarily
focused on immediately implementing the Commission's policy changes for wind power QF rate
eligibility. As a legislative body, the Idaho PUC is entitled to do that. However, when that
change materially and adversely impacts a party like Grouse Creek, that has worked for years
and invested hundreds of thousands of dollars relying on previously established rules, then the
change, as it applies to that party, must not be arbitrary and capricious, and must be grounded on
substantial evidence in the record. Order No 32635 and its predecessor Orders fail that test of
"reasonableness." 162
C.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE RULING OF THE IDAHO PUC REJECTING THE
GROUSE CREEK AGREEMENTS FOR THE REASON THAT THEY CONTAINED AGREED-TO
RATES, TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS AUTHORIZED BY PURPA 18 C.F.R § 292.30l(B)
AND THE IDAHO PUC IS WITHOUT POWER TO REJECT SUCH AGREEMENTS

Regulations under PURP A do not limit or restrict a utility's ability to sign contracts for
QF power at rates different than the PURPA approved avoided cost rate. Nor does PURPA's

161

Wash. Water Power, 101 Idaho at 575, 617 P.2d at 1250.
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Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 261, 715 P .2d at 931.
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requirement that a utility purchase QF power at avoided cost "affect the validity of any contract
entered into between a Qualifying Facility and an electric utility for any purchase." 163
In footnote 73 in Cedar Creek, FERC noted this alternative regulation as another avenue
it could have taken, in determining that the Idaho PUC' s rejection of Cedar Creek's contracts
were in violation of PURPA. In footnote 73, FERC said:
The record in this proceeding also suggests that provisions of section 292.30l(b)
of the [FERC] regulations may be applicable to Idaho PUC's decision in the June
8 Order. Section 292.301(b)(l) permits a QF and an electric utility to enter into a
contract containing agreed-to rates, terms, or conditions that may differ from
those that would otherwise be required by the [FERC's] regulations concerning
the determination of avoided cost rates. The [FERC] reasoned that a contractedfor-rate would never exceed true avoided costs and thus would be consistent with
PURPA. Order No. 69, FERC Stats. & Regs. i! 30,128 at 30,868. Moreover,
section 292.301(b)(2) provides that the [FERCs] avoided cost regulations (and a
state's implementation of those regulations) do not affect the validity of any
contract entered into between a QF and an electric utility. Accordingly, the
Idaho PUC' s rejection of the contract entered into by Rocky Mountain Power
and Cedar Creek, on the ground that the avoided-cost rate contained in the
contract is excessive, appears inconsistent with PURPA and the [FERC's]
regulations implementing PURP A. 164
The Idaho PUC rests the core of its argument in not approving the Grouse Creek
Agreements in its Remand Order No. 32635 on the fact that Idaho Power and Grouse Creek
voluntarily negotiated and signed such Agreements with an effective date of December 28, 2010,
and that the agreements were not in the public interest because they contained rates that were in

163

18 C.F.R. § 292.301 Scope. (a) Applicability. This subpart applies to the regulation of sales and
purchases between qualifying facilities and electric utilities.
(b) Negotiated rates or terms. Nothing in this subpart:
( 1) Limits the authority of any electric utility or any qualifying facility to agree to a rate for any
purchase, or terms or conditions relating to any purchase, which differ from the rate or terms or
conditions which would otherwise be required by this subpart; or
(2) Affects the validity of any contract entered into between a qualifying facility and an electric
utility for any purchase. (emphasis added).
164

137 FERC ~ 61,006 at p. 17, footnote 73 (emphasis added).
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excess of avoided cost rates Grouse Creek was eligible for on that date. 165 Such a finding, the
Commission noted, was "entirely consistent with ... the authority granted to us by PURP A and
FERC." 166 Specifically, the Idaho PUC said that its approval of the Agreements containing "a
rate in excess of the utility's avoided cost would clearly be a violation of PURPA and FERC's
. 1ementmg
. regul at1ons.
.
,,167
imp

To the contrary, the Idaho PUC's rejection of the Grouse Creek Agreements violates
Section 292.301(b) of FERC's regulations, which instead clearly requires that the Commission
honor contracts negotiated under PURP A, even if those contracts contain "agreed to" rates that
are different than those that the Commission would otherwise require. To the extent the Idaho
PUC wants to rely on the express terms of the Agreements, including their effective dates, the
Commission then must also accept the avoided cost rates contained therein, because 18 C.F .R. §
292.301(b) allows the rates in a negotiated agreement to be effective. Accordingly, the Idaho
PUC's failure to approve the Agreements because they contained incorrect avoided cost rates
(i.e., the "rate ... otherwise ... required" 168 ) is a clear violation of PURP A.

VIII. GROUSE CREEK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
LC.§ 12-121 provides that this court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
The basis for Grouse Creek's claim for an award of attorney's fees, should it prevail in its
appeal, is that the Idaho PUC has acted without a foundation or reasonable basis in law in
continuing to defend this case, in light of FERC' s decisions in Cedar Creek, Rainbow Ranch,
and Murphy Flat, and for disregarding its own Staffs recommendation to approve the
165

IPUC Order No. 32635, p. 10, R. p. 355. ("We recognized and chose to enforce the terms of the
Agreements that the parties entered into voluntarily.")
166

Id p. 11, R. p. 356.

167

Id. p. 16, R. p. 361.

168

18 C.F.R. § 292.30l(b)(l)
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Agreements because Grouse Creek had established a PURP A right to a legally enforceable
obligation as of December 9, 2010.
As discussed above, FERC's three decisions clearly state that the Idaho PUC's
'execution-date' "bright line" rule is an illegal implementation of PURP A. The same FERC
rebuke applies to the Idaho PUC's substitution of an 'effective date' rule for an 'execution date'
rule. Each is equally an illegal, mechanical rejection of Grouse Creek's right to a legally
enforceable obligation under PURPA. This Court clearly articulated in Rosebud II that when the
Idaho PUC's implementation of PURPA is not consistent with the FERC regulations, the
Commission has not "regularly pursued its authority," as required by I.C. § 61-629.

169

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) provides that an award of attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121 is
warranted when a case is defended "unreasonable or without foundation."

170

The Idaho PUC's

continuing refutation of FERC' s decisions is an "unreasonable" rejection of specific, controlling
legal guidance, and the Commission's decision to continue denying approval of the Grouse
Creek Agreements is "without foundation." 171
Finally, it was unreasonable and without foundation that the Idaho PUC rejected its own
Staffs recommendation to approve the Grouse Creek Agreements. 172 In an analogous case, this
Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees by a district court against a state agency when that
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Rosebud II, 128 Idaho at 632, 917 P.2d at 789.
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Sinclair & Co. v. Gurule, 114 Idaho 362, 757 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1988) (Attorney's fees will be
awarded when the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation). See also Hales v. King, 114 Idaho 916, 762 P.2d 829 (Ct. App. 1988).
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IPUC Order No. 32635: "FERC['s] Declaratory Order in Cedar Creek is not binding on the
Commission; FERC's Declaratory Order leads us to doubt whether FERC understood the basis upon
which this Commission made its initial decision to disapprove the Agreements." R. p. 357
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Idaho PUC Staff Legal Brief, February 6, 2012: "Based on a reasonable interpretation of the facts
in this case, and the actions of both the projects and Idaho Power, Staff believes that a legally enforceable
obligation was incurred no later than December 9, 2010-the date upon which the projects modified their
on-line dates." R. p. 315.
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agency rejected the advice of one if its hearings officers and instead chose to "rely solely on its
'specialized knowledge' and experience to reach the opposite conclusion." 173 Likewise, it was
unreasonable for the Idaho PUC to reject the sound legal advice of its own Staff and again affirm
its rejection of the Grouse Creek Agreements.

IX.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, Grouse Creek seeks from this Court:
(a)

Reversal of the Orders and decision by the Idaho Public Utilities Commission to

not approve the Agreements between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek,
b)

Remand back to the Idaho PUC for approval of the Agreements, but with

modifications to the Agreements to equitably place Grouse Creek back into the same commercial
position it would have been, had the Agreements been approved on June 8, 2010, and
c)

An award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal to Grouse Creek.

L t 'v-- day of March, 2013.
DATED this_/_

Ronald L. Williams, ISB 3034
Williams Bradbury, P.C.
Attorneys for Grouse Greek

173

Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281, 285, 160 P.3d 438, 442 (2007).

43

